Research on Multi-party Game in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application

Author:Lu Rong Wu

Supervisor:wang xin hua


Degree Year:2018





The coal mine safety is a major economic and social problem of common concern.The safety management is the foundation for coal mine.People always tend to be oriented to the accidents in formulating rules and measures of safety management.Through the preliminary study on the current situation of coal mine safety management in China,we believe that the emergence of safety management problems,such as management confusion,illegal operation,poor policy implementation and supervision loss,is the result of the fierce game between the parties concerned aiming at safety investment and safety benefit.Only by rationally distributing the interests among the relevant Stakeholders can we maintain the stability of coal production and the sustainability of safety management.This study will research the game strategy choice of each stakeholder to reveal the internal relations.Firstly,a multi-party evolutionary game model is established to analyze the selection of strategies.Through theoretical analysis and optimization of multi-party game model,applied research have been conducted on the game behavior and strategy selection of interested parties.Then,a simplifiied three party model is taken as an example to carry out detailed analysis and solution.The content of this chapter is the theoretical basis for the study of the following chapters.Based on stability theory of dynamics system and phase diagram analysis,this disser-tation studies evolutionary multi-party model to optimize of the behaviors of those interests parties and look for the adjustment mechanism of safety management policies and decisions.The conclusion shows that the dynamic system of the game model is not self-control.It can be concluded that game strategy selection is controllable under some incentive or constrain-t measures.Appreciate incentive and constraint measures can fully mobilize the initiative of inspection and supervision agencies,and urge coal miners to actively increase input of product ion safet y.Based on the theory of fractional calculus an a predictor-corrector numerical approach,a fractional multi-party supervision game model is set up.Then,the fractional model is solved by the Adams-Bashforth-Moulton(ABM)predictor-corrector calculation method.Some re-sults of numerical solutions analysed the behaviors of those Stakeholders related.The results of model simulation verify the scientific rationality of the fractional order security manage-ment game model,which provides a new research method and research direction for multi-party game models in safety management.According to evolutionary game theory,a multi-population replicator dynamic model is established to analyze the imitation behaviors of subpopulation in some Stakeholders for the success of others.Based on the theory of stability of dynamics system and phase diagram analysis,this dissertation researches the behaviors of those Stakeholders.The result shows how the charge of supervision of government department and enterprise staff’s technology impact on the efficiency of safety management,and the effect of penalty and incentive,skills training and other measuresIncentive compensation(dynamic cost)and dynamic penalty mechanism of incentive measures are taken to optimize the behaviors and strategies related to coal mine safety man-agement of interested parties.Stability analysis of the factors of strategy selection and the effects is made to seek the appropriate strategies and methods to control the volatility of game behavior.With comparative analysis of the safety management system and measures,the conclusions of the research may develop and provide a theoretical basis for the improvement of the system and measures of safety management for government departmentsMain results and conclusions of this research are summarized in the last part,and the future research contents related to this topic are also prospected.